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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPING INTERPRETATION TRAINING FOR MODIFYING THOUGHT-ACTIONFUSION ASSOCIATED WITH OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE SYMPTOMS
by
Stephan Siwiec
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor Han-Joo Lee

In obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), obsessions are in part caused by the belief that
simply having a thought can increase the chance of an event occurring or represents a person’s
morality. This phenomenon is Thought-Action-Fusion (TAF) and is common in OCD.
Challenging these beliefs through Interpretation Training (IT) has been used in past research to
modify negative interpretations, and lessen the distress and grief associated with them. The
current study examined whether three sessions of computerized IT, challenging TAF obsessional
thoughts, can impact TAF strength and OC symptoms. Thirty-nine non-clinical students were
randomized to either: (1) an active condition (TAFMOD), where participants are presented with
a sentence reducing the impact of the obsessional thoughts, or (2) a neutral condition
(TAFMAN), in which a non-disconfirming sentence is provided. Among the primary outcomes,
an interaction of group (TAFMOD vs TAFMAN) by time (pre-training to post-training) was
non-significant, but there were significant reductions by time alone in TAF scores, OC
symptoms, primary obsessions, and general anxiety and distress. Overall, the findings from the
current study do not support a difference between groups as a result of training, but there did
appear to be a general reduction of symptoms over time. Results of the study are discussed in
terms of the cognitive theory of obsessional thoughts, and future research directions are
suggested.
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Developing Interpretation Training For Modifying Thought-Action-Fusion Associated With
Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a devastating anxiety disorder characterized by
recurrent and intrusive obsessions (i.e. thoughts, images, or impulses) that lead to significant
levels of anxiety. The disorder also involves compulsive behavior, which is characterized as any
behavior, mental or physical, the sufferer feels driven to perform in a ritualistic manner, and/or
used to reduce distress or avoid a feared outcome. A paramount aspect the disorder is that the
obsessions and/or compulsions cause a significant increase in distress, cause social/occupational
impairment (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1999), and/or are time consuming (>1hour/day). Another
distinguishing feature of the disorder is that the bizarre thoughts associated with OCD are
heterogeneous and relative to the individual’s lifestyle and situation, thus two OCD sufferers
may have very different obsessions and compulsions from each other.
Prevalence and Course of OCD
Without treatment a typical course of OCD involves symptoms waxing and waning over
time, particularly during periods of increased stress, but without total remission of symptoms
(Ambramowitz, 2006; Steketee, Eisen & Dyck, 1999). It is estimated that approximately 2–2.5%
of the adult population suffers or will suffer from OCD during their lifetime (Kessler et al., 2005;
Ruscio, Stein, Chiu & Kessler, 2008), and an additional 21% to 25% of the general population
will experience subclinical symptoms (Fullana et al., 2009). The mean onset of the disorder is
19.5 years of age, with 25% experiencing the disorder by age 14, and epidemiological data
suggests onset typically spans from early adolescence to young adulthood (Antony, Downie &
Swinson, 1998; Swedo, Rapoport & Leonard, 1992) , with the disorder tending to affect males
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and females equally (Kolada, Bland & Newman, 1994; Karno, Golding, Sorenson & Burnam,
1988; Rasmussen & Tsuang, 1986) .
Impairment
Individuals with OCD often experience difficulties with interpersonal relationships
(Riggs, Hiss & Foa 1992), marital distress in 50% of patients seeking treatment (Emmelkamp,
Haan & Hoogduin 1990; Riggs, Hiss & Foa 1992), 1 in 3 patients with OCD are unable to
maintain employment, and of these individuals nearly 50% receive disability payments
principally related to their OCD (Koran, 2000; Leon, Portera, & Weissman, 1995; Mancebo et
al., 2008). Moreover, about 24% of individuals with OCD are thought to live at a substandard
socioeconomic status (Regier, Narrow, Rae & Manderschied, 1993). Not surprisingly, quality of
life is significantly lower among OCD sufferers when compared with published community
norms (Eisen et al., 2006).
Cognitive Theory of OCD
In the cognitive-behavioral model of anxiety disorders the experience of obsessive
thoughts (e.g. repulsive, horrific, aggressive, or even dangerous) are a normative experience and
not necessarily pathological symptoms of OCD (Rachman & De Silva, 1978). In fact, in a study
conducted by Rachman & de Silva (1978) around 90% of their non-clinical sample reported
experiencing obsessional thoughts. When obsessive thoughts occur in a non-clinical population
they are most often considered odd and random, but are not given more significance. What
differentiates those who develop OCD from those who do not is not the content of the obsessive
thought but how the thought is interpreted and coped with (Rachman & De Silva, 1978; Rassin,
Cougle & Muris, 2007). Similarly, Rachman (1997) suggests that individuals with OCD engage
in cognitive errors and misinterpret the presence and/or meaning of these thoughts as significant,
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threatening, and revealing of their hidden dark nature. Additionally, the more frequent
obsessional thoughts occur, the more proof to the OCD sufferer they must be significant and not
just random (Rachman, 1997). Moreover, OCD sufferers experience inflated responsibility
about their obsessional intrusions and any potential harm which may occur from them, thus they
are motivated to engage in various rituals to prevent any potential harm (Salkovskis, 1985). In
sum, the obsessive thoughts should be thought of as a triggering stimulus, and in a person with
OCD their cognitive error to ascribe significance to these thoughts is considered to be an
important process in forming and maintaining the disorder.
Thought Action Fusion
One of the most studied cognitive errors involving biased interpretations in OCD is
Thought-Action Fusion (TAF). TAF is currently viewed as one of a few cognitive errors by
which individuals with obsessional difficulties place undue significance and meaning to their
thoughts (e.g. magical thinking, over-responsibility), and believe their thoughts can influence
reality (Frost & Steketee, 2002; OCCWG, 1997; Shafran, 2004). The dysfunctional interpretation
that thoughts are equivalent of acts or thoughts can cause real life outcomes, tied with a personal
responsibility for the thoughts occurring, motivates the individual to strive to stop any feared
outcome associated with the thoughts (Shafran et al, 1996). This motivation compels the
individual to engage in behaviors which are typically intended to (a) actively resist the thoughts
(i.e. thought suppression), and (b) rituals that are utilized to decrease the anxiety or prevent
anticipated harm associated with the thought (i.e. contacting and warning their friend of a
possible car crash) (Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003).
There are two subtypes of TAF (Rassin, Diepstraten, Merckelback & Muris, 2001):
Moral and Likelihood TAF. Moral TAF (TAF-M) refers to an individual’s belief that
experiencing an unacceptable thought is as bad as carrying out the action (Shafran et al., 1996)
3

(e.g. “Thinking of sleeping with my brother’s wife is as bad as actually sleeping with her”).
Likelihood TAF (TAF-L) refers to the belief that having an intrusive and distressing thought
about an event increases the chances this event will come true (i.e. Thinking about a car accident
involving my best friend will actually increase the likelihood that it will come true) (Berle &
Starcevic, 2005; Rachman, 1997; Shafran, 2004; Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996). These
definitions clearly indicate that both TAF-M and TAF-L are interpretations that occur in
response to obsessional intrusions. TAF-M and TAF-L are conceptually distinguished but are
inter-related constructs (Berle & Starcevic, 2005) as existing findings by Shafran et al. (1996)
and Rassin, Merkelbach et al. (2001) demonstrated that the two factors are moderately correlated
(r=0.44 and r=0.32 respectively). This makes sense as many obsessional intrusions may be
capable of resulting in both TAF-M and TAF-L, but the individual’s belief in TAF-M and TAFL may differ depending on their idiographic interpretation processes. For example, an individual
might have a distressing thought wishing their mother dead, and may be perceive this thought as
both immoral and increasing the likelihood their mother will die. Yet another individual with the
same thought may perceive the though as immoral but they do not believe there is an increase in
the chances their mother will die.
Research shows that TAF-L can be further divided into TAF-Likelihood Others (TAFLO) and TAF-Likelihood Self (TAF-LS). TAF-LO refers to the increase in chance of a negative
event occurring to someone else because of the thought, while TAF-LS refers to thoughts which
increases the chance of a negative event occurring to the individual with the thought. TAF-LO
and TAF-LS have both been shown to associate with pathology, but TAF-LO seems particularly
tied to high OC symptoms in non-clinical populations (Rassin et al., 2000). Thus, when looking
at student or community samples it is important to sufficiently represent the TAF-LO subtype in
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a non-clinical study when TAF-L is addressed. In contrast, in clinical OCD populations a two
factor model of TAF (TAF-M and TAF-L) has been supported better (Meyer & Brown, 2013).
How does TAF contribute to OCD?
From the current cognitive-behavioral perspectives of OCD (Rachman and De Silva,
1978; Rassin, Diepstraten, et al., 2001; Salkovskis, 1985; Safran et al., 1996), there are at least
two well-known theories that attempt to explain how TAF may contribute to obsessional
symptoms. The first is a cognitive model that expresses those high in TAF tend to make
attributions of inflated responsibility or an evil nature to their obsessional thoughts (Salkovskis,
1985; Shafran et al., 1996). Thus, individuals who believe the thoughts are representations of
their true thoughts and nature are likely to experience increased distress as TAF amplifies the
negative meanings attached to the presence of the thoughts. Further, this increased emotional
salience of the thoughts is likely to increase its frequency of occurrence.
The second theory stresses the role of thought suppression in OCD (Rassin, Diepstraten,
et al., 2001). According to this theory, cognitive avoidance in the form of thought suppression is
often used as a coping mechanism to escape the anxiety triggered by the intrusive thought.
Attempts at suppressing these thoughts, could however, results in more frequent intrusions, and
even escalation into pathological obsessions (Wegner, 1989; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, &
White, 1987). As Wegner (1989) explained, “an obsession can grow from nothing but the desire
to suppress a thought” (p. 167). This phenomenon is termed the “white bear effect” and it is
premised on the basic behavioral principle that posits that avoidance of a feared stimulus
prevents a reduction of the fear from occurring (i.e., habituation). Berle and Starcevic (2005)
argue that those high in TAF believe they are morally responsible for their thoughts, and because
of the great importance and individual attributes to these thoughts occurring, actions such as
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thought suppression enacted by the individual are understandable. Rassin, Diepstraten, et al.,
(2001) emphasized that thought suppression can be conceptualized as a form of neutralization
activity used to ease or nullify the distress brought on by an intrusive thoughts (e.g. praying,
confessing, superstitious rituals, reassurance seeking, etc.). It has been hypothesized that
utilizing this method of harm avoidance is an extension of the tendency to fuse thoughts with
real-life events (Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, Neary, & Brigidi, 2001), thus tying it directly to TAF.
Strength of TAF association with OCD
The importance of an individual’s interpretation and meaning ascribed to their
obsessional thought in OCD is not a new concept. There is growing evidence to suggest that
both TAF and thought suppression interact and contribute in the development of obsessional
problems (Rachman, 1997; Rassin, Muris, Schmidt & Murkelback, 2000). In their
comprehensive study on TAF, Rassin et al., (2000) used a structural modeling approach to
conclude directionality in the development and maintenance of TAF among 173 undergraduate
psychology students. The results supported a model in which TAF leads to attempts at
neutralization via thought suppression, which in turn predicts more OC symptoms. When the
data were analyzed with TAF broken down into TAF-M and TAF-L, the model remained intact,
indicating both TAF-M and TAF-L are distinct contributing factors in OC symptoms. However,
the data also suggested that it is more plausible that it is the likelihood component specifically
which directly influences OC symptoms. These results support those found by Rassin,
Merckelbach, Muris, and Spaan (1999) that suggested TAF may play a causal role in the
development of intrusive thoughts.
Yet, recent research has not provided robust support for the specificity of TAF to OCD,
as TAF occurs in subclinical samples for OCD (Amir et al., 2001; Muris et al., 2001), but also
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generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Muris et al., 2001), schizotypy (Lee et al., 2005, Muris and
Merckelbach, 2003), and depression (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Muris et al., 2001; Rachman et al,
1995, Rassin et al., 2001; Shafran and Rachman, 2004). Likewise, the specificity of TAF to
OCD in clinical populations has not been supported as TAF has displayed associations to GAD
(Thompson-Hollands et al., 2013), major depressive disorder (Hossein et al., 2012), and
schizophrenia (Kabakci, Demir, Demirel, & Sevik, 2008).
Research findings have consistently indicated that TAF displays influence in many
different disorders, yet its strongest influence is with OCD and OC symptoms (Muris et al.,
2001). In a study by Muris et al. (2001) 427 non-clinical adolescents were assessed and TAF
was found to be associated with a broad range of anxiety disorder symptoms. However, when
correlational analysis was used to control for trait anxiety TAF was still found to be significantly
related to OCD. Supporting this finding, in a recent study by Meyer and Brown (2013) of the
psychometric properties of the Though-Action-Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran, Thordarson, &
Rachman, 1996), a validated measure of TAF, the authors found in a clinical outpatient sample
(n=700) that the total TAFS scores were more strongly related to OCD features than to either
worry or depression. In line with this finding, TAFS total scores have consistently displayed an
association to OC symptoms (Shafran et al., 1996), with many studies reporting mild to moderate
ranges of association between TAF and obsessional pathology (0.20 to 0.38; Gwilliam et al.,
2004, Rassin et al., 2000; Rassin, Diepstraten et al., 2001; Rassin & Koster, 2003; Rassin,
Merkelbach et al., 2001).
The relevance of TAF for OCD has been demonstrated more strongly for TAF-L, relative
to TAF-M. Researchers have found TAF-L to be related to OC symptoms and general worry
(Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Meyer & Brown, 2013; Shafran et al., 1996), while TAF-M does not
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seem to be significantly and specifically related to obsessional complaints (Abramowitz et al.,
2006; Shafran et al, 1996; Shafran & Rachman, 2004). However, in a student sample (n = 600)
by Bailey et al., (2014), TAF-M displayed stronger associations to a measure of OC symptoms
than to any other measure of pathology (i.e. symptoms of agoraphobia, depression and
generalized anxiety). Additionally TAF-M displays efficacy as a marker of general pathology
when it is in excess of what is accepted in the individual’s culture (Siev, Chambless, & Huppert,
2010) (i.e. excessive guilt about using blasphemous curse words or lustful thoughts), and it is
consistently related to depression (Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003; Shafran et
al., 1996), a common co-occurring disorder with OCD. Taken together, it is reasonable to
conclude that both TAF-L and TAF-M are important cognitive biases with important theoretical
and clinical relevance for OCD, although their specificity has not been consistently
demonstrated.
Can TAF be Influenced or Reduced?
Cognitive theory and recent research suggests that TAF may contribute to the
maintenance of OCD, thus, cognitive interventions designed to reduce TAF are expected to
lower the level of OCD symptoms (Rassin, Diepstraten, et al., 2001). Rachman (1997) strongly
encourages that in OCD treatment changing misinterpretations of intrusive thoughts is an
important goal: “It follows from the theory that the most direct and satisfactory treatment of
obsessions is to assist patients in modification of putatively casual catastrophic
misinterpretations of the significance of their intrusive thoughts. Bluntly, if these
misinterpretations are ‘corrected’, the obsession should cease” (p. 799). From these
considerations, an important question to ask is “Is TAF a modifiable interpretation bias that is
subject to change?” As Rachman et al., (1996) first demonstrated using a “sentence completion
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paradigm”, researcher are able to evoke OC-relevant negative interpretations of intrusive
thoughts (Rachman et al., 1996; van den Hout, can Pol, & Peters, 2001). In this sentence
paradigm participants are asked to think of a close friend or loved-one, then read a sentence
meant to elicit OC-relevant intrusive thoughts, then write the name of a close friend or loved-one
into the sentence, and then visualize it occurring (e.g. I hope ____ is in a car accident).
Immediately following the sentence paradigm participants experienced substantial increases in
anxiety, guilt, and feelings of responsibility from this manipulation. As important as findings that
TAF can be brought on experimentally is that TAF can be reduced. Research has found that
TAF decreases with successful treatment of patients with OCD using cognitive behavioral
therapy, even without specifically addressing it (Jonsson, Hougaard & Bennedsen, 2011; Rassin,
Diepstraten, et al., 2001; Shafran & Rachman, 2004). Additionally, in non-clinical samples,
there is some evidence that TAF severity, and reported anxiety, may be significantly reduced
utilizing broad “anti-TAF” strategies (Zucker, Craske, Barrios, & Hoguin, 2002). Zucker et al.,
(2002) found in a sample of 72 undergraduates who scored highly on the TAF subscale of the
Responsibility Appraisal Questionnaire (RAQ; Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran, & Woody,
1995), giving them a simple “anti-TAF” message (“Often, when people have these bothersome
thoughts they feel as though somehow, their thoughts will make the event more likely to happen.
This way of thinking is wrong.”), before writing a sentence and visualizing a TAF relevant
scenario (i.e. hoping a close friend would be hurt in a car accident), significantly lowered TAF
subscale scores from baseline to post-task (t(32)=3.61; p<0.001; about 20% reduction in the TAF
scores), and prevented some of anxiety and the urge to neutralize elicited by the sentence
paradigm. This is an important finding indicating TAF can be reduced by directly disputing its
erroneous nature. However, this study showed only a mild level of reduction in TAF, probably
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due to a single intervention session and its training modality (based on persuasion rather than
interpretation training).
In a study by Marino-Carper, Negy, Burns and Lunt (2010) the authors recruited 139
undergraduates with high TAF. The authors divided the participants into three groups, either
psychoeducation on TAF, psychoeducation on thoughts and cognitions, or psychoeducation on
stress. All three groups then completed a task to elicit TAF and the authors found at post
assessment participants who had received psychoeducation regarding TAF reported significantly
lower TAF-M scores than participants in groups who had received psychoeducation regarding
either thoughts in general or stress. With respect to the amount of change in TAF-L from
baseline to 2-week follow-up, the TAF-education group showed about 30% reduction, whereas
the General-education group showed a 20% increase and the Stress-education group showed no
significant change in TAF scores. In addition, the group that received psychoeducation regarding
TAF was the only group that did not experience a significant increase in thought suppression
from baseline to post-intervention, and was also the only group to experience an increase in both
frequency of and belief in low-responsibility thoughts from baseline to follow-up.
Research evidence continues to support that TAF can be reduced in both clinical and nonclinical populations, and targeted interventions towards changing this cognitive bias are likely to
prove fruitful.

Cognitive Bias Modification
A promising emerging area of research in anxiety disorders treatment is cognitive bias
modification (CBM). A cognitive bias refers to the tendency to give priority in processing to
negative or threatening information, either through increased allocation of attention resources
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(attentional bias) or via rapid assignment of negative or threatening appraisals to ambiguous
information (interpretive bias) (Williams, Blackwell, Mackenzie, Holmes, & Andrews, 2013).
As mentioned earlier, the presence of interpretive biases, particularly to negative moral or
likelihood thoughts, is in-line with the major cognitive models of OCD.
In general, CBM is a cognitive experimental methodology that works by modifying a
participant’s biases (either attentional or interpretation) suspected to contribute to maintaining
the psychopathology by training healthier responses (Williams et al., 2013). CBM has
demonstrated efficacy in modifying cognitive biases implicated in the anxiety disorders and the
resultant change in selective information processing has been shown to impact upon clinically
relevant symptoms (MacLeod, 2012). For example, CBM techniques have shown effectiveness
in reducing clinical symptoms and dysfunction across a range of disorders including depression
(Lang, Moulds, Holmes, 2009; Williams et al, 2013), generalized anxiety disorder (Amir, Beard,
Burns, & Bomyea, 2009), and social anxiety (Rapee et al., 2013). Significantly, following CBM
training research has displayed reductions in symptoms (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002), as well as
emotional reactivity to subsequent stressor tasks (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009). These results
suggest that changes in symptoms and reactivity to stressor tasks may reflect the development of
new trained associations. Thus, CBM may prove to be a fruitful therapeutic technique in
addition to exposure based interventions, or when exposure based interventions are rejected or
fail.
Interpretation Training (CBM-I)
So, how can CBM be applied to OCD? A technique in CBM called interpretation
training (CBM-I) is growing in evidence of its impact in OCD treatment. CBM-I’s purpose is to
modify a subject’s maladaptive cognitive appraisals about personally relevant emotional
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information by training healthier, less threatening interpretations. This process has been shown
in past research to be effective, and the training of healthier interpretations led to lower distress
and impairment (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Moreover, CBM-I is well accepted by patients
and with low reports of dropout from trainings (Clerkin & Teachman, 2011).
In utilizing CBM-I past research has employed a word completion task designed to have
participants imagine themselves in scenarios intended to elicit negative OC-relevant
interpretations (Beadel, Smyth & Teachman, 2014; Clerkin and Teachman, 2011; Williams &
Grisham, 2013). In the active training condition participants are presented with common
obsessional thoughts, and then presented with a following sentence reducing the impact of the
previous statement. Then before moving on, the participant must “fill-in” missing letters for a
key word crucial to the interpretation of the sentence. This ensures the participant reads the
sentence and understands the meaning (e.x. “You and a friend are having a personal discussion.
You tell her that you sometimes have bizarre thoughts about hurting people you care about –
thoughts you don’t really want to have. Your friend tells you this is really nor_al”). The neutral
condition differs in that participants are not provided with a disconfirming thought, and
completes a word in-line with an OC-relevant interpretation (e.x. in the sentence above the word
“we_rd” is used instead of “nor_al”). Utilizing this “sentence paradigm” across five
experiments, Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) confirmed that this experimental procedures was
successful in producing in participants the intended pattern of interpretation; either modified
interpretations in the active group, or no change in interpretation in the control group (MacLeod
& Clark, 2013).
A study by Clerkin and Teachman (2011), utilized CBM-I to evaluate whether nonclinical participants high in OC symptoms could be trained to attribute less significance and
12

adopt healthier interpretations towards their intrusive thoughts. The authors split participants into
either Positive (n = 50) or Neutral (n = 50) CBM-I conditions and tested whether this training
influenced participants’ later responses to an OC-stressor task (a task designed to provoke
distress and urges to engage in a compulsion or neutralization behavior). The positive group was
always required to resolve an ambiguous scenario in a manner inconsistent with an OC
interpretation (e.g. would need to fill in the word “normal” in regards to worries about the
strangeness of obsessional thoughts), while the neutral group were required to solve half the
scenarios inconsistent with an OC interpretation, and half consistent with an OC interpretation.
What the researchers found was those participants high in OC symptoms, and placed in the
positive bias interpretation training condition endorsed healthier OC-relevant interpretations and
beliefs following training (compared to a neutral training group), and reported less negative
emotion during a following stressor task after controlling for baseline negative affect.
Similarly, a study by Williams & Grisham (2013) testing the efficacy of CBM-I for OC
symptoms recruited 89 non-clinical participants and assigned them to either a positive CBM-I
condition (n = 41) or control CBM-I condition (n = 37). In both conditions participants were
provided with an ambiguous scenario and then required to add a letter to complete a key word
that determined the meaning of the sentence in a positive or negative manner (e.g. You are riding
the bus home from work. The passenger beside you sneezes so you offer them a tissue. You think
to yourself that offering a tissue was a behavior that was k_nd/ r_sky”). In the positive condition
participants filled in words which lead to positive interpretations of the ambiguous situation.
The control condition differed in that half of the situations were resolved in a positive manner,
while the other half were resolved in a negative manner. Results indicated the participants in the
positive condition evidenced changes in interpretation bias towards more positive interpretations
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compared to the control condition. Much like the study by Clerkin and Teachman (2011),
participants engaged in an OC Stressor task designed to elicit in the importance of thoughts, and
participants in the positive condition reported less distress and urge to neutralize compared to
those in the control condition. Further, the authors found the severity of participants’ OC
symptoms at baseline did not moderate the effects of positive interpretation training, thus the
training effects were robust (Williams & Grisham, 2013).
A study by Yiend et al., (2014) conducted a double blind randomized controlled study
looking at the impact of a single session of CBM-I on depression, and subsequent influence on
mood and resilience to stress. The study recruited 40 community individuals seeking treatment
of depression and assigned 19 to the active group (CBM-errors intervention) and 21 to the
control group (neutral interpretation). Results indicated that a single session of CBM-I was
enough to induce positive interpretation bias in clinically depressed individuals, but there was
little evidence for changes in mood or stress response. The authors suggest that it is possible
additional session of CMB-I for depression could have impacted mood and stress response, but
this would have to be investigated in future research. Although this study is not about OCD, the
findings add to the literature demonstrating the potential clinical utility of CBM-I in changing
interpretation biases.
A meta-analysis was conducted by Hallion and Ruscio (2011) on the effectiveness of
CBM on cognitive biases, anxiety and depression. The authors reviewed 45 studies, which
incorporated over 2,591 participants, and found that CBM-I’s ability to impact biases displayed a
large effect size of (g = 0.81), while CBM-A effect size was much smaller (g = 0.29). These
findings were not impacted by the clinical characteristics of the sample, the number of training
sessions, or type of control group. Additionally, both forms of CBM had a small but significant
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effect on symptoms in posttests (g = 0.13, p < .001). The authors note that the effect sizes for
symptom change in CBM studies does not match effect sizes in empirically supported treatments
for anxiety disorders, but the effect sizes show promise as possible complementary interventions
administered in conjunction with traditional psychotherapy (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011).
There is strong support for the ability of CBM procedures to change interpretation bias in
different pathologies (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Lang, Moulds, Holmes, 2009;
Rapee et al., 2013; Williams et al, 2013; Yiend et al., 2014), and these changes in interpretation
bias are reliably accompanied by decreases in both distress and impairment (Mathews &
Mackintosh, 2000; MacLeod, 2012). Consistently participants report high acceptability with the
CBM procedures (Clerkin & Teachman, 2011), and along with the growing findings in the
efficacy for CBM-I for OCD (Clerkin and Teachman, 2011; Williams & Grisham, 2013), the
training displays promise as a potential complementary intervention to current empirically
supported interventions in the disorder (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Yet, before any further
assertions can be made to incorporate CBM-I into OCD treatment further support for its ability
to lower relevant OC-related cognitions is needed.
OCD Treatment and Limitations
Currently, the most efficacious treatment of OCD is exposure and response prevention
(ERP), yet some patients find this treatment unacceptable even before beginning it (Foa et al.,
2005). A treatment is only effective if it is able to be applied, thus it is imperative that
treatments for OCD continually display efficacy but also improve in acceptance by patients.
Other hindrances to OCD treatment include insufficient gains from therapy (Eddy, Dutra,
Bradley, & Westen, 2004), relapse following treatment (Riggs & Foa, 1993), or failure to
respond in ERP in about 25-45% patients (Franklin, Abramowitz, Kozak, Levine & Foa, 2000;
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Riggs & Foa, 1993; Stanley & Turner, 1995). Additionally, it is not uncommon for those with
OCD to wait between 7-10 years before initiating treatment (Marques et al., 2010; Rasmussen &
Tsuang, 1986), and even when OCD sufferers seek treatment, they are rarely receiving wellestablished, efficacious treatment from a competent therapist (Marques et al., 2010; Stobie et al.,
2007).
Some patients are unwilling to engage in any form of cognitive or behavioral treatment.
For these patients utilizing medications to reduce obsessions might be a viable first step before
enticing them to begin CBT (Barlow, 2002). Medication use for OCD have demonstrated
increases in symptom relief, yet there are some significant issues, such as, 1) any gains from
medication use for OCD vanish if medication is stopped (Eddy et al., 2004)., 2) there are some
unfavorable side effects for patients because of their use (i.e. SRI, MAOI, Tricyclic use)
(Abramowitz, Franklin, & Foa, 2002; Eddy et al., 2004)., and 3) even if symptoms do decrease,
they could still remain at a clinically significant level (Eddy et al., 2004). Moreover, research
devoted to enhancing the effects of psychological and pharmacological treatments has shown
negligible effects, and specifically a combination of ERP and clomipramine is not superior to
ERP alone (Foa et al., 2005).
In acknowledging the limitations of the current treatments for OCD, without question,
there is a great need to improve them and create viable supplements and/or alternatives.
Improvements and advances can be approached by both increasing treatment acceptability to
sufferers and by ensuring treatment dissemination, which may be in the form of shorter targeted
treatments. In this line of thought, assessing the potential value of utilizing additive or
alternative treatments in OCD - such as CBM-I - is important to consider and research. This is
not without precedent, as Abramowitz et al, (2005) reported decreases in dropouts in exposure-
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based treatments were accompanied by inclusion of cognitive techniques. CBM-I has displayed
great efficacy in changing cognitive biases in various disorders, and is highly accepted by
participants, thus it is a logical choice to further research as a potential treatment in OCD.
Why choose TAF for the current interpretation training study?
There are several reasons to specifically target TAF with CBM-I in the current study.
First, TAF has been shown as an important cognitive bias in OCD (Thompson, 2013); especially,
cognitive theories of OCD highlighting TAF’s contributing role in the maintenance of
obsessional intrusions and their negative experiences. Second, research has indicated that TAF is
a malleable cognitive process that is responsive to interventions, even those using a brief
psychoeducational procedure (Marino-Carper et al., 2010; Rassin et al., 2001, Thompson, 2013;
Zucker et al., 2002). Third, TAF is an interpretation bias that is specifically linked to triggering
events (i.e., obsessional thoughts), which makes it a good candidate for applying the CBM-I
paradigm. Therefore, a targeted intervention aimed at modifying interpretations of obsessional
thoughts linked to TAF appears likely to help those high in OC symptoms decrease their TAF
belief, and potentially lowering the severity of their intrusive thoughts as well.
The novelty in the current proposal was the utilization of computers in CBM-I for TAF.
The use of computerized interventions is becoming more and more common for various
disorders, as computers have the potential to help reach people without psychological resources
geographically close to them, treatments can be done in the privacy of one’s home, and CBM-I
is generally well accepted by patients.

The current study
The Objective and hypotheses of the Current Study
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The study recruited UWM undergraduates (n=39) who displayed high OC symptoms and
randomly assign them to either the active or control training conditions. The active condition is
TAF Modification (TAFMOD), designed to decrease TAF linked to obsessional thoughts. The
maintenancecondition is TAF Maintenance (TAFMAN), designed to sustain TAF-like
interpretation of obsessional thoughts. We sought to test the following hypotheses:
1) There will be a reduction in TAF from baseline to post in the TAFMOD group, while
no significant change in TAF from baseline to post will be displayed in the TAFMAN group.
2) Those in the TAFMOD group will display greater reductions in (1) the severity of
overall obsessional symptoms and (2) the severity of the primary (= the most distressing)
obsession. As an exploratory hypothesis, if we find significant reductions in emotional distress,
obsessional frequency, or obsessing severity, we will examine whether these reductions are
associated with changes in TAF.
3) Individuals in the TAFMOD group will report an ease of use, as well as overall
favorable reactions to this intervention (Treatment Acceptability Questionnaire).
Methods
Eligibility and Recruitment
UWM undergraduates who are at least 18 years old and who were interested in the study
completed the study’s online consent form, as well as the OCI-R and TAFS (online prescreening
measures) through the SONA website. UWM undergraduates who completed the online consent
and the prescreening measures and display OC symptoms by either (A) either a score of 21 and
over on the OCI-R (Foa, et al., 2002), or a score of 4 or higher on the obsessing subscale of the
OCI-R (Foa, et al., 2002), and (B) a score of 21 or higher on the TAFS, were invited to sign-up
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for a study appointment through SONA. There are no established cutoff scores for the TAFS,
but using pilot study data using a cutoff of 21 eliminated the bottom third of participants, and
ensured those who progressed further in the study had a level of TAFS at baseline which was
able to be potentially improved by post assessment. Additionally, individuals whose primary
language is not English were not included in the study. Assessment and training programs are all
written in English (we are not able to present a version in another language) – it is important for
participants to understand subtlety of slightly varying vignettes in the training program. Taken
together, recruited 39 students with elevated OC symptoms and TAF beliefs who took part in an
initial computerized screening and determined eligible.
Participants
Thirty-nine non-clinical students at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) a
participated in the current study in exchange for course credit and a ten dollar gift card. The
mean age of participants was 26 years (SD = 8.87), and participants were predominately female
(76.9%). The sample was composed of a variety of ethnic and racial characteristics (with
multiple selections allowed): 56.4% White, 28.2% Black, 12.8% Asian or Pacific Islander, 2.6%
Native American, and of these 7.7% identified as Hispanic, and 2.6% Multiracial.
Measures
Self-Report Measures:
The Thought-Action-Fusion Scale (TAFS) (Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996) is a
19 item self-report measure which assesses the degree to which a person lends importance and
responsibility to a variety of intrusive and distressing thoughts containing moral and likelihood
themes. The measure uses a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (Disagree Strongly), to 4 (Agree
Strongly). There are 12 moral TAF questions and 7 likelihood TAF questions. TAFS Likelihood
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Example: “If I think of myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall ill.” TAFS Moral
Example: “Thinking of cheating in a personal relationship is almost as immoral to me as
actually cheating.” The scale provides a moral TAFS subscale score (TAF-M), a likelihood
TAFS subscale score (TAF-L), and an overall total score used to determine overall severity.
There are no cutoff scores but higher TAFS scores are indicative of higher rates of TAF
cognitions (Shafran et al., 1996). In student and community samples the TAFS-L scale is broken
down into the TAFS-LS scale (likelihood to self) and the TAFS-LO (likelihood to others)
because various studies have shown that although both TAFS-LS and TAFS-LO are both
associated with OC symptomatology (Berle & Starcevic, 2005), and TAFS-LO’s association is
particularly strong (Shafran et al., 1996). The three scale model has displayed moderate to strong
association between the scales (r=.25 - .69; Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam, & Kalsy, 2003;
Bailey, Wu, Valentiner, & McGrath, 2014; Coles, Mennin, & Heimberg, 2001; Rassin,
Merkelbach et al., 2001). The TAFS was used as a primary outcome measure at baseline, after
each IT session, and during post-training assessment to determine changes in overall TAF
severity (TAF total score), but also changes in moral TAF (TAF-M) and likelihood TAF (TAFL) scores.
The Obsessive-compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-R) (Foa et al., 2002) is an 18-item
measure of OCD symptoms. Participants rate the degree to which they have been bothered by
OCD symptoms in the past month on a 5-point scale from 0 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“Extremely”).
The measure assesses six types of symptoms: (1) Washing, (2) Checking, (3) Obsessing, (4)
Mental neutralizing, (5) Ordering, and (6) Hoarding. A score of 21 or greater is a recommended
cutoff for the presence of OC symptomatology (Foa et al., 2002). The OCI-R was administered
to assess the severity of obsessing, as well as the overall severity of OC symptoms.
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The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Checklist (Y-BOCS Checklist) (Goodman et
al., 1989) is a 57 item self-report measure which identifies current and past obsession and
compulsions. The obsession checklist of the Y-BOCS includes various domains of mental
intrusions: (a) Aggressive Obsessions, (b) Contamination Obsessions, (c) Sexual Obsession, (d)
Hoarding/Saving Obsessions, (e) Religious Obsession, (f) Symmetry or Exactness, or (g) other
Miscellaneous Obsessions. The Y-BOCS Checklist will serve to identify the primary obsession
for each participant (i.e., the most distressing obsession chosen by the participant), and this
obsession was used during the POETS.
The Primary Obsession Evaluation of TAF Scale (POETS) is an author-constructed selfreport scale which is designed to assess the participant’s TAF emotional reaction toward their
primary obsession. The TAFS measures general TAF interpretations, and the POETS was
constructed as there was no measure to assess TAF-relevant emotional and cognitive reactions
toward a specific (primary) obsessional intrusion. In using the POETS a study clinician helps the
participant identify their primary obsessive thought using the participant’s Y-BOCS Obsession
Checklist as a guide, and asking about any “current” endorsed obsessions. (See appendix C for
measure details). The scale uses a 7-point scale from 0 (“not distressing at all”), to 6 (“extremely
distressing”) in regards to the primary obsessional thought (causing the most distress). The scale
uses the main obsessional thought and then asks questions in 3 domains (5 questions each): (1)
General Emotional Reactions, (2) Moral TAF, and (3) Likelihood TAF. In considering the
primary obsessional the 3 domains were created in relevance to the TAF construct as the general
emotional reaction domain gauges comfort with the presence of the thought, the moral domain
gauges the moral implications of the thought to the individual, and the likelihood domain gauges
the belief to which having the thought will cause it to occur.
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The Revised Obsessional Intrusions Inventory (ROII) (Purdon & Clark, 1993; Purdon &
Clark, 1994) is a 52 item measure of the frequency of obsessional intrusive thoughts, images,
and impulses. Participants rate the frequency of each of the 52 obsessional thoughts on a 7-point
scale from 0 (“I have never had this thought”), to 6 (“I have this thought frequently throughout
the day”). The measure was used at baseline and post-training assessment to determine changes
in the frequency of obsessional thoughts, images, and impulses of the participants.
The Revised Obsessional Intrusions Inventory - Distress (ROII-Distress) is a 52 item selfreport measure, modified from the original ROII by the study authors, to assess how distressing
various intrusive thought, images, and impulses would be to the participant in the event of their
intrusion. Participants rate the distress associated with different thoughts on a 7-point scale from
0 (Not Distressing), to 6 (Extremely Distressing). Unlike the original ROII, the ROII-Distress
does not use a time frame as the obsessive thoughts, images, or impulses may not have occurred
to the participant yet, but asks instead if the thought occurred what their level of distress would
be. The measure was used at baseline, after each CBM-I training, and at the post-training
assessment to determine any changes in the distress participants report to various obsessional
thoughts, images, and impulses.
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21) (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a 21
item self-report scale that measures the extent the participant is experiencing three emotional
states (depression, anxiety, and stress) and asks 7 items for each emotional state. The measure
uses a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (“did not apply to me at all”), to 3 (“applied to me very
much, or most of the time”). This measure was given at baseline and post-training assessments
to determine any changes in emotional states pre and post study IT.
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The Treatment Acceptability Questionnaire (TAQ) (Hunsley, 1992) is a 6-item self-report
measure which is modified by the study authors from the original 6-item TAQ to instead inquire
about training acceptability (modified from “treatment acceptability”) and study staff (modified
from “treatment provider”). The measure is given after each IT and at the post-training
assessment to examine the participant’s experience and opinion with the study IT and study staff.
Each question is on a 7-point scale with responses closer to 1 more negative and responses closer
to 7 more positive.
Clinician Administered Measures
The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) (Goodman et al., 1989) is a 12item semi-structured interview designed to assess the severity, belief in, and details about the
patient’s most upsetting obsessions and compulsions. Each item is scored ranging from 0 (not
present), to 4 (extreme symptoms). The scale provides totals for both obsessions and
compulsions, with both added together to create a total score, where a cutoff of 16 is generally
used to identify clinically symptomatic levels of OCD. This scale is used at baseline and posttraining assessments by a study clinician as the primary measure of OC symptom severity in
participants.
The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I) (Sheehan et al., 1998) is a
clinician administered semi-structured interview addressing emotional disorders (anxiety and
depressive disorders), eating disorders, substance use, alcohol use, and psychotic symptoms.
This measure was used to determine psychopathology and comorbidity of disorders in study
participants.
The Clinical Global Impression Severity & Improvement Scale (CGI-S & CGI-I) (Guy,
1976). The CGI-S is a 1 question clinician rated scale in which the participant’s illness (i.e.
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OCD) is rated based on the clinician’s experience with other participants with the same disorder.
The CGI-S is on a 7-point-scale from 1 (normal) to 7 (extremely ill) and is given at both the
baseline and post-training. Whereas, the CGI-I is a report on the participant’s improvement or
worsening of symptoms based on the participant’s baseline score. The CGI-I on a 7-point-scale
from 1 (much improved) to 7 (very much worse) and is only given at the post-training
assessment.

Interpretation Training (Active Training vs. MaintenanceTraining)
The current study used a computerized interpretation training version of the procedures in
the “word completion task” used in past research (Clerkin and Teachman, 2011; Williams &
Grisham, 2013; Beadel et al., 2014) which presents a statement to the participant meant to elicit
either moral or likelihood TAF.
In the active condition participants are presented with an obsessional thought meant to
elicit either moral or likelihood TAF, and then presented with a following sentence reducing the
impact of the previous statement. Before the participant is able to move on they must fill-in a
missing letter inside a key word for the interpretation of the sentence. Example: I was eating
lunch with my best friend. All of a sudden, a thought of poking my friend’s eye with my fork came
into my head. Having this thought in my mind is (meani_gless), as everyone has these thoughts
but they almost never lead to any action. If the participant fails to fill in and correctly spell the
key word they are given an error message and told to try again. This procedure ensures that the
participant reads each sentence and understands the meaning.
The maintenance condition differs in that participants are not provided with a
disconfirming sentence, and instead are provided with a sentence in line with TAF beliefs.
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Example: I was eating lunch with my best friend. All of a sudden, a thought of poking my friend’s
eye with my fork came into my head. Having this thought in my mind is (unaccept_ble). If my
friend knew what I was thinking he/she would have thought I am dangerous and unpredictable.
Like the active condition, participants are unable to move on until they correctly solve the word
with the missing letter.
In both the TAFMOD and TAFMAN conditions participants worked on a computer
through 80 randomized distressing thought scenarios as part of their interpretation training. Each
time the participant is successful in completing the incomplete word they are presented on the
next page with one sentence of encouragement, and then proceed to the next thought scenario on
the next page. The first interpretation training took take place on the same day as the baseline
assessment. The following 2 trainings were sent to the participants through a secure links pasted
into emails. If participants do not have an Internet-connected computer at home, they were
guided to complete this training procedure in our laboratory.
Procedures
Pre Screening.
General information about the study is found on the UW-Milwaukee online research
study participation site (SONA) and those interested were directed to the study’s prescreening
consent form. Once an electronic signature is provided participants were automatically
presented with an electronic version of the OCI-R and TAFS. Participants at or above the OCI-R
cutoffs (total score ≥ 18, or obsessing scale ≥ 5) and TAFS cutoff (total score ≥ 21) were
contacted by study staff and asked to set up a baseline assessment appointment. Participants
below the cutoff scores were sent an email thanking them for their interest but informing them
they are not eligible.
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Pre-Training Assessment
The RA obtained a signature on the main study consent form, after answering of the
participant’s any questions or concerns. Participants then preceded though computerized selfreport questionnaires which included a demographics questionnaire, contact information sheet
(to gain primary email and phone numbers), and self-report measures containing the Y-BOCS
checklist, TAFS, revised ROII-Distress Assessment Scale, ROII-Frequency Assessment Scale,
DASS, OCI-R, and POETS. These self-report questionnaires took participants between 30
minutes to 1 hour to complete. Importantly, participants were instructed to let the study staff
know when they reached the POETS (the final self-report measure), as at this point an IE spook
with the participant, using their responses on the Y-BOCS checklist, to confirm a primary
obsessive thought for the POETS. Next the study IE conducted the M.I.N.I. to screen for
potential emotional, substance, or eating disorders, the Y-BOCS Severity form in order to obtain
initial levels of OC distress and impairment, and the CGI-S for clinical severity of OC
symptoms.
Randomization
Following the baseline assessment, using a preset computerized randomization list,
participants were be randomized to either the TAFMOD or TAFMAN conditions.
Interpretation Training and Process Measures
Following randomization participants started their appropriate CBM-I condition training
(TAFMOD or TAFMAN). Each training session and accompanying measures took about 21
minutes to complete (SD = 9.2), with a range from 12 to 44 minutes.
After each training session participants completed process measures to evaluate potential
changes in relevant variables which may change following CBM-I: the TAFS to assess TAF
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belief, the ROII-Distress Assessment Scale to assess emotional reactions, the POETS to assess
their emotional reactions to their primary obsessional thought, the PANAS to assess current
mood, and the TAQ to determine how acceptable treatment was to the participant.
The second and third trainings (along with corresponding process measures) were
emailed to participants five days after completing their previous training, and participants were
instructed to complete each individual training in one sitting in a private and quite location.
Post-Training Assessment
The Post-Training Assessments were scheduled to occur at least three days after the third
training was completed. In the rare instances when a participant does not finish all 3 study
trainings in an acceptable amount of time (around three weeks) we still invited them to the lab to
conduct this post-training assessment.
The Post-Training assessment measures procedures are identical to the baseline
assessment except the M.I.N.I. only included the OCD module and any other positively endorsed
modules from the baseline assessment, and both the CGI-S and CGI-I were rated.
Data Analysis
To test hypothesis 1 (i.e., the effect of TAFMOD vs. TAFMAN on the level of TAF) and
hypothesis 2 (i.e., TAFMOD’s impact on OC symptoms), we conducted a series of repeated
measure ANOVAs, including Group (TAFMOD vs. TAFMAN) and Time (Pre-training vs. Posttraining assessment). A significant Group by Time interaction in these analyses would indicate
differential change in the target outcome variable (e.g., TAF or obsessional severity) between the
two training conditions. However, despite the multiple comparisons (i.e., repeated measure
ANOVAs on TAF), severity of overall mental intrusions (i.e. distress, frequency, and overall
severity), and severity of primary obsession, we did not apply a Bonferroni correction. The
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Bonferroni correction is intended to reduce Type I errors when multiple tests or comparisons are
conducted, but it also would cause a decrease in power for the study (Moran, 2003; Nakagawa,
2004; Verhoeven, Simonsen & McIntyre, 2005). At this exploratory stage in this line of work it
is important to examine many relevant outcome variables and the Bonferroni correction is too
stringent, especially when effect sizes and p-values will be reported for each analysis.
To test hypothesis 3, that those in the TAFMOD condition would report an ease of use
and favorable reaction to CBM-I, we examined TAQ data at a descriptive level (TAQ domains:
1. Acceptability, 2. Ethics of procedure, 3. Effectiveness of training, 4. Possible side effects, 5.
knowledge of study staff, 6. Trustworthiness of study staff). There are no established cutoff
scores for the author modified TAQ so statistical analysis would be unreliable. Also, evaluation
of treatment acceptability and experience in the TAFMAN group is not relevant; thus, only the
TAFMOD group was examined for the treatment experience.
The study aimed to recruit 17 participants for both the TAFMAN and TAFMOD group.
In consideration that there is a lack of previous research on the effects of CBM-I on TAF or other
relevant outcomes, we assumed a standard medium effect size for power analyses (f=.25). For
the clinical utility of the training program, we aimed to detect at least a moderate size of training
effect on the reduction of TAF/OC symptoms. In close approximation to our study design, when
using a repeated measure ANOVA (2 assessment time points and 2 training conditions), with an
α = .05, a correlation of .5 among repeated measures, and a nonsphericity correction of 1.0.
Based on this power analysis, the required sample size is 17 per group to achieve the power of
.80 in detecting a medium-sized Group by Time interaction effect (f =.25, which corresponds to
η2p =.06) on change in TAFS (Hypothesis 1) or change in obsessional symptom indices
(Hypothesis 2). After taking into account an approximate 20% patient attrition (n=6), a total of

28

40 recruited participants (= 20 per group) would offer an adequate sample size to detect a
medium size of effects.
Results
Participants
There were 186 UWM undergraduate students who completed the online prescreen for
the study, 91 were eligible to participate, and 39 completed a baseline assessment and were
randomized. Of the 39 eligible, 22 were allocated to the TAFMOD group and 17 to the
TAFMAN group. Of those in the TAFMOD group, 16 finished all the study procedures, while
10 of the TAFMAN group did the same. For those who dropped from the study there is no clear
understanding of the exact reason, they simply became unresponsive to messages and prompts to
continue with the study. Two participants in the TAFMAN group withdrew. One participant
withdrew before randomization because she became too overwhelmed when speaking about a
period of depression during the MINI, and the second participant decided after being randomized
that he did not have the time or interest in completing the rest of the study procedures.
Unfortunately, due to slow recruitment and some participant dropout currently the study
has 16 TAFMAN and 10 TAFMOD participants who completed all study procedures. Given the
sample size of 26 the actual power in the study lowered to .69.

Consort Diagram
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Demographics and Baseline Characteristics
Comparing the demographic and baseline characteristics of all those who were randomized,
the two groups did not differ in respect to gender (p = .67), age (p = .18), ethnicity (p = .36),
marital status (p = .18), past psychological treatment obtained (p = .74), or current psychological
treatment (p = .46).

Table 1
Baseline Demographics of All Eligible Participants

Gender
Female
Male
Age

TAFMOD
n = 22

TAFMAN
n = 17

16 (72.7)
6 (27.3)
X=26.64
(SD=8.9)

13 (86.7)
2 (13.3)
X=23.47
(SD=6.2)

p = .67

Ethnicity
11 (50.0)
9 (40.9)
2 (9.1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (4.5)
16 (72.7)

14 (93.3)

Married
Divorced/Annulled
Past Psych Treatment
Yes
Talk Therapy/Counseling

3 (13.6)
3 (13.6)

0 (0)
1 (6.7)

Drug Therapy
Other

t (37) =1.37
t (37) = -.93

White
Black
Asian
Pacific Islander
Native American
Multiracial
Hispanic/Latino
Marital Status
Never Married

Drug Therapy
Other
Current Psych Treatment
Yes
Talk Therapy/Counseling

Fisher’s
Exact Test
or T-test
(2-sided)

10 (66.7)
1 (6.7)
3 (20)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (6.7)
p = .57

p = .74
13 (59.1)
13 (59.1)

11 (73.3)
10 (66.7)

5 (22.7)
0 (0)

8 (53.3)
0 (0)

5 (22.7)
4 (18.2)

6 (40)
4 (26.7)

3 (13.6)
0 (0)

5 (33.3)
0 (0)

p = .46

Note. Percentages presented in brackets (%)
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Comparing the demographic and baseline characteristics of all those who were study
completers, the two groups did not differ in respect to gender (p = .12), age (p = .34), ethnicity (p
= .53), marital status (p = .48), past psychological treatment obtained (p = .68), or current
psychological treatment (p = 1.0).

Table 2
Baseline Demographics of Study Completers

Gender
Female
Male
Age

TAFMOD
n = 16

TAFMAN
n = 10

11 (68.8)
5 (31.2)
X=26.06
(SD=7.77)

10 (100)
0 (0)
X=23.20
(SD=6.6)

Ethnicity
White
Black
Asian
Pacific Islander
Native American
Multiracial
Hispanic/Latino
Marital Status
Never Married
Married
Divorced/Annulled
Past Psych Treatment
Yes
Talk Therapy/Counseling
Drug Therapy
Other
Current Psych Treatment
Yes
Talk Therapy/Counseling
Drug Therapy
Other

Fisher’s
Exact Test
or T-test
(2-sided)
p = .12

t (24) =.96
t (24) = .63

9 (56.3)
6 (37.5)
1 (6.3)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)

7 (70)
1 (10)
2 (20)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)

12 (75)
2 (12.5)
2 (12.5)

9 (90)
0 (0)
1 (10)

9 (56.3)
9 (56.3)
4 (25)
0 (0)

7 (70)
6 (60)
5 (50)
0 (0)

5 (31.5)
4 (25)

3 (30)
3 (30)

3 (18.8)
0 (0)

3 (30)
0 (0)

p = .48

p = .68

p = 1.0

Note. Percentages presented in brackets (%)
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Training Data
The two groups were very similar in the manner in which they engaged in training, with the
TAFMOD group completing slightly more trainings on average (TAFMOD mean = 2.68,
TAFMAN mean = 2.29), average time to complete a training (TAFMOD mean = 19.16,
TAFMAN mean = 17.42), the percent of participants who completed all three trainings
(TAFMOD mean = 77.3, TAFMAN mean = 64.7), and average number of days to complete all
study procedures (TAFMOD mean = 25.5, TAFMAN mean = 21.8).

Table 3
Interpretation Training Information
TAFMOD

TAFMAN

2.68

2.29

21.10
16.50
19.89

20.25
18.00
14.00

100
86.4
77.3

88.2
64.7
64.7

8.17
6.53
12.44
25.5

6.36
4.73
10.45
21.8

Avg. # Training Sessions Completed
Avg. Completion Time (mins)
Training 1
Training 2
Training 3
Participants Completed (%)
Training 1
Training 2
Training 3
Avg. Days Between Trainings
T1 to T2
T2 to T3
T3 to Post
Baseline to Post
Note. Avg. =Average, (%) = Percent, Mins = Minutes
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Table 4
ANOVA of Study Measures at Pre-Training and Post-Training Assessments
TAFMOD

TAFMAN
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Pre

Post

Pre

Post

Group

Time

Group x Time

Measure

Mean
(SD)

Mean
(SD)

Mean
(SD)

Mean
(SD)

df

F

ηp2

p

df

F

η p2

p

df

F

ηp2

p

TAFS Total

40.00
(10.63)

23.63
(14.54)

41.10
(11.35)

28.70
(15.82)

1,24

0.52

0.02

0.48

1,24

21.27

0.47

0.01

1,24

0.41

0.02

0.53

TAF Moral

27.69
(9.66)

16.13
(10.00)

25.50
(8.34)

20.00
(10.60)

1,24

0.06

0.01

0.81

1,24

19.83

0.45

0.01

1,24

2.5

0.09

0.13

TAFS
Likelihood

12.31
(6.93)

7.50
(7.94)

15.60
(5.46)

8.70
(7.59)

1,24

0.81

0.03

0.38

1,24

16.54

0.41

0.01

1,24

0.53

0.02

0.48

OCIR Total

28.58
(12.29)

21.00
(14.42)

28.40
(6.79)

22.20
(12.66)

1,24

0.01

0.01

0.92

1,24

9.85

0.29

0.01

1,24

0.11

0.01

0.74

OCIR
Obsess

4.38
(2.33)

3.06
(2.29)

4.30
(2.31)

3.00
(2.26)

1,24

0.01

0.01

0.93

1,24

7.22

0.23

0.01

1,24

0.01

0.01

0.99

YBOCS
Total

12.00
(8.34)

10.29
(7.26)

16.80
(5.65)

12.70
(8.12)

1,22

1.52

0.07

0.23

1,22

7.95

0.27

0.01

1,22

1.34

0.06

0.26

YBOCS
Obsession

5.07
(3.63)

4.64
(3.79)

8.10
(2.77)

6.00
(4.32)

1,22

2.36

0.1

0.14

1,22

5.77

0.21

0.03

1,22

2.52

0.10

0.13

YBOCS
Compulsion

6.93
(5.15)

5.64
(4.19)

8.70
(3.80)

6.70
(6.41)

1,22

0.59

0.03

0.45

1,22

3.39

0.13

0.08

1,22

0.16

0.01

0.69
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ROII
Frequency

107.86
(52.18)

105.43
(38.59)

98.67
(26.12)

96.56
(34.31)

1,21

0.3

0.01

0.59

1,21

0.15

0.01

0.71

1,21

0.01

0.01

0.98

ROII
Distress

190.88
(85.65)

144.13
(77.16)

163.00
(84.82)

119.60
(60.85)

1,24

0.94

0.04

0.34

1,24

7.44

0.24

0.01

1,24

0.01

0.01

0.92

POETS
Total

57.31
(21.91)

46.25
(22.15)

69.80
(16.76)

55.50
(20.99)

1,24

1.88

0.07

0.18

1,24

18.97

0.44

0.01

1,24

0.31

0.01

0.58

POETS GE

23.31
(7.49)

20.38
(8.24)

26.10
(7.95)

22.40
(6.58)

1,24

0.72

0.03

0.41

1,24

7.51

0.24

0.01

1,24

0.1

0.01

0.76

POETS
Moral

15.44
(9.58)

11.81
(8.25)

20.90
(7.75)

14.60
(10.67)

1,24

1.46

0.06

0.24

1,24

14.05

0.37

0.01

1,24

1.02

0.04

0.32

POETS
Likelihood

18.56
(7.36)

14.06
(8.39)

22.80
(7.05)

18.50
(5.93)

1,24

2.65

0.1

0.12

1,24

10.63

0.31

0.01

1,24

0.01

0.01

0.94

DASS Total

76.13
(29.13)

66.13
(23.33)

76.00
(22.05)

75.40
(23.59)

1,24

0.28

0.01

0.6

1,24

1.04

0.04

0.32

1,24

0.82

0.03

0.38

DASS
Depression

23.75
(10.75)

20.75
(7.89)

25.60
(7.71)

27.40
(12.26)

1,24

1.57

0.06

0.22

1,24

0.09

0.01

0.77

1,24

1.46

0.06

0.24

DASS
Anxiety

22.88
(8.97)

19.25
(7.99)

22.00
(8.42)

21.80
(6.70)

1,24

0.08

0.01

0.78

1,24

1.46

0.06

0.24

1,24

1.17

0.05

0.29

DASS Stress

29.50
(11.72)

26.13
(9.37)

28.40
(9.23)

26.20
(8.24)

1,24

0.07

0.79

0.79

1,24

0.07

0.79

0.79

1,24

0.07

0.01

0.79

Hypothesis 1 - TAF Time and Condition Comparison ANOVA
To test hypothesis 1 we conducted a series of repeated measure ANOVAs on TAFS total
scores and its subscales (likelihood and moral), including Time (Pre-training vs. Post-training
assessment) and Condition (TAFMOD vs. TAFMAN) (see Table 4). For TAFS total scores, the
Group X Time interaction was not significant, (F(1,24) = .406 , p = .530, ηp2 = .02). There was
not a significant main effect of group, (F(1,24) = .52 , p = .48, ηp2 = .02), but there was a
significant main effect of time (F(1,24) = 21.27 , p = .001, ηp2 = .47 ). Both groups experienced
significant reductions in TAFS from baseline to post (TAFMOD 41.9% reduction, TAFMAN
30.2% reduction) (see Figure 2).
The TAFS Moral subscale interaction of Group by Time, displayed a non-significant
trend, (F(1,24) = 2.503, p = .127, ηp2 = .09), with a small-sized effect size. When comparing
mean score change between the groups, the TAFMOD group experienced significant reductions
(M = 16.13, SD = 10.00, 41.8%), while the TAFMAN groups TAF Moral scores experienced
moderate reductions (M = 30.00, SD = 10.60, 21.6%) (see Figure 3).
In looking at the TAFS Likelihood subscale, the interaction of Group by Time was not
significant, (F(1,24) = .525, p = .476, ηp2 = .02), but both TAFMOD (M = 7.50, SD = 7.94, 39.1%
reduction) and TAFMAN (M = 8.70, SD = 7.59, 44.3% reduction) experienced significant drops
in scores (see Figure 4).
Hypothesis 2 – TAFMOD will display greater reductions in overall obsessional severity
(frequency or distress) and the severity of primary obsession.
To test hypothesis 2 (i.e., TAFMOD’s impact on obsessional severity), we conducted a
series of repeated measure ANOVAs, including a Group by Time interaction for the ROII
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Frequency Scale, ROII Distress Scale, and OCI-R Obsession scale (see Table 4). The
interaction was not significant for the ROII Frequency Scale (F(1,21) = .001, p = .98, ηp2 = .01)
(see Figure 6), ROII Distress Scale (F(1,24) = .01, p = .92, ηp2 = .01) (see Figure 5), and OCIR
Obsession Subscale (F(1,24) = .008, p = .93, ηp2 = .01) (see Figure 7). There was not a significant
main effect of group, for any of the scales, but there was a significant main effect of time for the
ROII Distress (F(1,24) = 7.44, p = .001, ηp2 = .24), and OCIR Obsession Subscale (F(1,24) =
7.22, p = .01, ηp2 = .23), and approaching significance for the ROII Frequency Scale (F(1,21) =
0.15, p = .70, ηp2 = .01). Both groups experienced general reductions in obsessional severity
scores in various OC symptom measures from baseline to post, but with no significant group
difference.
Primary Obsession Analyses
Next, a Group by Time repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the primary
obsession measure in the study, the POETS. The POETS is broken down by total score, and
subscales for general emotionality (GE), moral TAF, and likelihood TAF (see Table 4). The
interaction of Group by Time was not significant for the POETS Total Score (F(1,24) = .309, p =
.583, ηp2 = .01), and was not for any of the subscales (see Figure 8), POETS GE (F(1,24) = .099,
p = .099, ηp2 = .01) (see Figure 9), POETS Moral (F(1,24) = 1.020, p = .323, ηp2 = .04) (see Figure
10), POETS Likelihood (F(1,24) = .005, p = .942, ηp2 = .01) (see Figure 11). There was not a
significant main effect of group for any of the scales, but there was a significant main effect of
time for POETS Total Score (F(1,24) = 18.97, p = .001, ηp2 = .44), POETS GE (F(1,24) = 7.51, p
= .001, ηp2 = .24), POETS Moral (F(1,24) = 14.05, p = .001, ηp2 = .37), and POETS Likelihood
(F(1,24) = 10.63, p = .003, ηp2 = .31). It appears that most participants experienced a reduction in
their negative reactions toward primary obsession from pre-training to post-training.
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Measures of general OCD symptoms
Next, as part of an exploratory set of analyses beyond the second hypothesis, we
conducted Group by Time repeated measures ANOVAs of general OCD symptoms for the OCIR
total scores, YBOCS total scores, YBOCS Obsession Scale, and YBOCS compulsion scores (see
Table 4). The interaction was not significant for the OCIR total score (F(1,24) = .113, p = .740,
ηp2 = .01), YBOCS total (F(1,22) = 1.34, p = .26, ηp2 = .06), YBOCS Obsession Scale (F(1,22) =

2.52, p = .13, ηp2 = .10), and YBOCS Compulsion Scale (F(1,24) = .160, p = .693, ηp2 = .01).
There was not a significant main effect of group, for any of the scales, but there was a significant
main effect of time for the OCIR Total (F(1,24) = 9.85, p = .004, ηp2 = .29), YBOCS Total Score
(F(1,22) = 7.95, p = .001, ηp2 = .27), YBOCS Obsession Scale (F(1,22) = 5.77, p = .03, ηp2 = .21),
and approaching significance for the YBOCS Compulsion Scale (F(1,22) = 3.39, p = .08, ηp2 =
.13). Participants in both groups also experienced reductions of their general OC symptoms from
pre-training to post training.
General emotional distress
Finally, a Group by Time repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the measures of
general emotional distress, the DASS and its subscales for depression, anxiety, and stress (see
Table 4). The interaction of group by time was not significant for the DASS Total Score
(F(1,24) = .815, p = .376, ηp2 = .03), or for any of the subscales, DASS Depression (F(1,24) =
1.46, p = .239, ηp2 = .06), DASS Anxiety (F(1,24) = 1.173, p = .290, ηp2 = .05), and DASS Stress
(F(1,24) = .074, p = .788, ηp2 = .01). There was not a significant main effect of group or time
with the DASS and any of the subscales.
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Hypothesis 3 - General Treatment Acceptability of Training in the TAFMOD Group
In general, participants in the TAFMOD group found the training to be acceptable
(mean=4.81, SD=1.38), ethical (mean=5.69, SD=1.49), effective (mean=4.44, SD=1.26), and
acceptable (mean=5.38, SD=1.54). Participants also rated the treatment provider as very
knowledgeable (mean=6.19, SD=1.11) and very trustworthy (mean=6.00, SD=1.46). Overall,
computerized CBM-I treatment appears to be accepted and tolerable for almost all participants,
with no participants reporting minimum scores in any domain.
Table 5
TAQ Participant Report of Training Acceptability
1. Overall, how acceptable did you find the treatment to be?
2. How ethical do you think this treatment was?
3. How effective do you think this treatment was?
4. How acceptable were the side effects of this treatment?
5. How knowledgeable do you think your treatment provider was?
6. How trustworthy do you think the psychologist was?

Mean

Std. Deviation

4.81

1.37

5.69

1.49

4.44

1.26

5.38

1.54

6.19

1.10

6.00

1.46

Correlations of Mean Change Scores from Pre-Training to Post-Training
First, to look into the relationship of baseline measures scores in TAFS and OC symptom scores
we ran a Pearson correlation between the measures (see Table 7). What we observed was a
significant positive correlation between TAF total scores and measures of overall OC symptoms
(OCI-R), and the frequency of distressing thoughts (ROII Frequency), and a significant
correlation with main obsession scores (POETS Total). The two TAFS subscales showed a
significant correlation with OC symptoms and frequency of distressing thoughts, yet the
subscales differed as only the TAFS Likelihood displayed a significant correlation with the main
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obsessional thoughts. The TAFS was not significantly correlated with Clinician YBOCS Total
scores or ROII Distress scores.
To look into the relationship between symptom change scores in TAFS and OC
symptoms, zero-order Pearson correlations were examined among mean change scores from PreTraining to Post-Training. What was observed was that change scores from TAF-related
measures (TAFS and POETS) and their subscales were significantly correlated. Changes in
TAFS scores were not significantly correlated with reductions in overall OCD symptoms, as
measured by the OCI-R and Y-BOCS. Reductions in TAF Likelihood was associated with
reduction in overall obsessional frequency (ROII frequency) with a medium effect size (r = .35),
which was not significant due to low power. Additionally, a reduction in moral TAF toward the
primary obsession (POETS Moral) was significantly associated with the reduction in YBOCS
Obsession (r =.53). Overall the pattern did not show robust associations between changes in TAF
and changes in OC symptoms in the current study sample. Also, the changes in general TAF
beliefs and changes in TAF toward their primary obsessions seem to be associated with OC
symptom change in a different pattern.
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Table 6
Pearson Correlations of Mean Change Scores from Pre-Training to Post-Training

TAF Total

TAF Moral

TAF Likelihood

OCIR Total

Clinician
YBOCS Total

POETS Total

1.00

TAF Moral

.85**

TAF Likelihood

.69**

0.20

OCIR Total

.54**

.41*

.45**

Clinician YBOCS
Total

0.18

0.16

0.10

0.20

POETS Total

.36*

0.22

.36*

.48**

0.32

ROII Distress

0.17

0.12

0.14

0.18

0.24

0.05

ROII Frequency

.51**

.39*

.40*

.47**

.50**

.50**

41

TAF Total

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

ROII Distress

0.20

Table 7
Pearson Correlations of Mean Change Scores from Pre-Training to Post-Training
TAF
Total

TAF
Moral

TAF
Likelihood

OCIR
Total

OCI-R
Obsession

Clinician
YBOCS
Total

Clinician
YBOCS
Obsession

Clinician
YBOCS
Compulsion

ROII
Distress

ROII
Frequency

POETS
Total

POETS
GE

42

TAF Total

1

TAF Moral

.93**

TAF
Likelihood

.86**

.62**

OCIR Total

.363

.34

.31

.15

.19

.06

.67**

.19

.21

.11

.40*

.44*

.21

.20

.16

.37

.12

.53**

.10

.13

.04

.25

.44*

.85**

.02

ROII Distress

.03

.02

.03

-.01

.34

-.03

-.16

.07

ROII
Frequency

.27

.16

.35

.25

.28

.24

.40

.04

.09

POETS Total

.61**

.48*

.65**

.22

.13

.18

.42*

-.05

.06

.33

POETS
General
Emotionality

.46*

.41*

.41*

.41*

.36

.49*

.39

.34

.21

.27

.72**

POETS Moral

.43*

.31

.51**

.06

-.03

.10

.53**

-.21

-.21

.21

.72**

.24

POETS
Likelihood

.49*

.38

.54**

.05

-.02

-.14

.05

-.19

.14

.25

.80**

.42*

OCI-R
Obsession
Clinician
YBOCS Total
Clinician
YBOCS
Obsession
Clinician
YBOCS
Compulsion

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

POETS
Moral

.36

Discussion
Prominent cognitive theories of OCD have directly posited TAF’s contributing role in the
maintenance of obsessional intrusions and their negative experiences. Additionally, research has
consistently reported that TAF is cognitive process that is responsive to interventions (MarinoCarper et al., 2010; Rassin et al., 2001, Thompson, 2013; Zucker et al., 2002). Therefore,
developing a targeted intervention aimed at modifying interpretations of obsessional thoughts
linked to TAF appeared to be a useful line of research to help those high in emotional problems
associated with TAF biases.
Overall, the current results did not show a significant difference between the TAFMOD
and TAFMAN group in reducing TAF beliefs and OC symptomatology, although both groups
displayed a significant reduction not only in TAFS, but in general OC symptoms as well. Our
first hypothesis was that a reduction in TAF from baseline to post in the TAFMOD group would
be found, while no significant change in TAF from baseline to post would be displayed in the
TAFMAN group. For TAFS total scores, there was no significant Group by Time interaction
[F(1,24) = .406 , p = .530] or main effect of group, [F(1,24) = .52 , p = .48]. There was only a
significant main effect of time [F(1,24) = 21.27 , p = .001]. Both groups experienced significant
reductions in TAFS from baseline to post (TAFMOD 41.9% reduction, TAFMAN 30.2%
reduction). Additionally, on the TAFS Likelihood and Moral subscales, the interaction of Group
by Time was also non-significant. On the TAF Moral subscale the TAFMOD scores
experienced a large drop (M = 16.13, SD = 10.00, 41.8%), while the TAFMAN groups scores
displayed a moderate decrease (M = 30.00, SD = 10.60, 21.6%). Conversely, on the TAF
Likelihood subscale both groups experienced significant drops in scores (TAFMOD 39.1%
reduction, TAFMAN 44.3% reduction). Taken together, these results indicate that both groups
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experienced notable drops in general moral and likelihood TAF from Pre-Training to PostTraining. Notably, the TAFMOD group experienced twice as much of a reduction in moral
scores than the TAFMAN group. These findings are in-line with the study hypotheses that
TAFMOD is more effective in reducing moral TAF than TAFMAN.
Our second hypothesis was that participants in the TAFMOD group will display greater
reductions in (1) the severity of overall obsessional symptoms and (2) the severity of the primary
(= the most distressing) obsession. Between the two conditions there was no significant Group
by Time interaction for the ROII Frequency scale, ROII Distress scale, the OCIR Obsession
scale, or the POETS and any of its subscales. Though, when looking at the main effect of time
there were significant reductions (or trend for reductions) in the following measures and their
subscales: ROII Distress Scale, ROII Frequency Scale OCIR Obsession Subscale, and POETS
(total, GE, moral, likelihood). In an exploratory analyses incorporating measures of general OC
symptoms the same pattern existed, where no Group by Time, or Group interactions were
significant, but the effect of time was significant for the OCIR Total, YBOCS Total, YBOCS
Obsession Scale, and YBOCS Compulsion scores. These findings indicate that the two groups
did not differ significantly in their pattern of symptom reduction, but both groups continued to
display significant drops in obsessional symptom, primary obsession scores, and even general
OC symptoms at post-training. The approximately equivalent symptom reduction in both
groups was unexpected, as the TAFMAN training was not constructed to challenge current TAF
beliefs and therefore influence reductions in OC symptoms and primary obsessional severity.
Our last hypothesis was that individuals in the TAFMOD group would report an ease of
use, as well as overall favorable reactions to this intervention. Results indicated participants
reported favorable experiences of the intervention and its format. Treatment acceptance was
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examined as the subject matter of the trainings could be emotionally distressing for participants,
and lead to dislike of the training. The general support for the training in the study is in line with
past CBM-I research which also reported generally very favorable participant acceptance
(Clerkin & Teachman, 2011).
Correlational analyses were conducted to examine the associations between change
scores in our study key study measures, including the TAFS. Results indicated that changes in
TAFS and its subscales were not significantly correlated with changes in measures of OC
symptomatology, but it was correlated significantly with changes in the POETS and its
subscales. The POETS is designed to assess the participant’s TAF reaction toward their primary
obsession. Therefore, a drop in overall TAF beliefs would be expected to correlate with drops in
POETS scores. Consequently, even though there were drops in both TAF scores and OC
symptoms scores after training, these reductions appear to be mostly independent of one another.
Another consideration in the findings from the study is the reductions in OCD symptom
scores, which was surprising given the relatively short time period. It is well accepted in
research that OC symptoms will wax and wane along with stress in the sufferer’s life, but true
remission of symptoms without treatment is rarely experienced (Ambramowitz, 2006; Steketee,
Eisen & Dyck, 1999). The lowering of TAF in the matter of a few weeks, or even a single
intervention has been found in past research (Zucker, Craske, Barrios, & Hoguin, 2002), but the
amount of reduction of OC symptoms in a few week period was unexpected. As stated earlier,
there is strong support for the ability of CBM-I to change interpretation bias in various
pathologies (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Lang, Moulds, Holmes, 2009; Rapee et al.,
2013; Williams et al, 2013; Yiend et al., 2014), and changes in interpretation bias are
consistently associated with decreases in both distress and impairment (Mathews & Mackintosh,
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2000; MacLeod, 2012). But the drop in OC symptoms over roughly three weeks was more than
was anticipated in a training meant to influence one of a few major cognitive biases in OCD.
Yet, the sample was not a true clinical sample, and caution must be employed before considering
any impact of training beyond a student sample.
It is important to note that change in TAFS total and subscale scores correlated strongly
with the POETS, a measure which assess the participant’s emotional and cognitive reaction
toward their primary obsession. This makes theoretical sense, in that as both groups saw
decreases in their TAF belief, the negative impact of their primary obsession would decrease as
well. The decrease in POETS total and subscales score also follows the main findings of the
study that both the TAFMOD and TAFMAN group both experienced decreases in main outcome
measures.
What are possible explanations for these null findings in the context of overall symptom
improvements across group? One plausible explanation for overall symptom improvement in
both conditions is demand characteristics. During the consent procedure, participants were
informed that the purpose of the study is to determine if multiple sessions of interpretation
training can influence the impact of distressing thoughts. It is possible participants could
interpret the study description to mean that we were looking for improvements in scores due to
trainings. This expectation could have motivated some participants to display a greater lowering
of symptoms than they objectively experienced from Pre-Training to Post-Training in order to
help satisfy our study goals.
As both groups displayed general decreases in TAF, OC symptoms, and primary
obsession scores, another consideration for overall symptom reductions is the influence of a
regression towards the mean. The sample primarily consisted of non-clinical undergraduates,
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primarily non-clinical, who displayed elevated initial TAFS and OCI-R scores.

Participants

were selected for the study based on cutoff scores, thus it is possible our sample consisted of
participants with inflated initial scores, whose scores would naturally decrease at post-training.
Participants drawn to the study may have been experiencing an increase in intrusive thoughts due
to various reasons (e.g. exam stress, academic costs, interpersonal issues, etc) and were drawn to
the subject matter of the study. This is similar to the phenomenon that doctors see flu patients at
their worst, thus without the direct influence of professional advice or medications patients will
generally improve in symptoms simply by the passage of time. It is possible that participants
reduction in pre-training to post training could be a natural trend over time towards their general
mean state. If the regression to the mean is true, it would help to explain why both training
condition groups showed improvements.
Another consideration would be that both groups experienced reductions in their TAF
and general OC symptoms for different reasons. The TAFMOD group may have derived benefit
for the reasons presumed, that the IT helped alter dysfunctional interpretations for intrusive
thoughts, and they learned to incorporate these cognitive reappraisals for their own intrusive
thoughts. The TAFMAN group may have derived benefit from other non-interpretative
processes such as habituation, as they were presented with 80 randomized distressing thought
scenarios but they did not receive interpretation training to challenge these thoughts. As a result,
it is possible the TAFMAN group experienced a general habituation to the scenarios over the
course of the training. When the participants experience their own intrusive thoughts in the
future they have learned the anxiety is temporary and will dissipate on its own without them
attending directly to it. The idea of experiencing habituation through the trainings could also
have been experienced by the TAFMOD group as well. It is possible those in the TAFMOD
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group also experienced anxiety and distress from at least a portion of the thought scenarios, and
if cognitive reappraisal inherent in this group’s training did not help them, then like the
TAFMAN group, they would experience habituation and a drop in their anxiety over the course
of the trainings.
A different possibility could be best termed an inoculation or normalizing effect. The
specific content of obsessions is very ideographic, thus our scenarios may not have touched on
the specific concerns of individual participants. Going through the TAF training without directly
tapping the individual specific obsession may have provided a lower distress learning situation.
In this situation the participant is able to evaluate the thought and lack of negative outcome from
similar, but not identical, obsessions to their own. Then, when obsessional thoughts occurred for
these participants in the future the tolerance of the past thoughts may have increased their overall
tolerance to subsequent TAF-ridden experiences of inappropriate mental intrusions.

Limitations
The current study has some clear limitations. Firstly, the study completers sample
contained a surprisingly high amount of participants who had either sought either psychological
or drug treatment in the past (TAFMOD = 56.3%, TAFMAN = 70%), or were currently
receiving psychological or drug treatment (TAFMOD = 31.5%, TAFMAN = 30.7%). This high
amount of treatment experience was unexpected, but the two conditions did not differ
significantly in the amount of treatment experience at Pre-Training. Engagement in treatment
was not followed systematically, so it is possible that changes in treatment may have occurred
during study participation. Currently, the impact of possible changes is also unknown.
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A second potential limitation to address was the level of dropout in the study, with only
16 of 39 participants completing all the study procedures. The amount of dropout during the
procedures was relatively equal between the TAFMAN group (29.4%), versus the TAFMOD
group (27.7%), but still indicated that about one-third of the randomized participants did not
finish the study procedures. The reasons for participant dropout is unclear, as participants who
dropped were unresponsive to email contact, but there are two likely reasons. First, the subject
matter and themes of the trainings, and even measures battery, covers topics and ideas which
may be aversive to some participants. Therefore, participants may have chosen to stop
proceeding in the study rather than continue being prompted to think about cognitions and
symptoms they would prefer not to. This explanation is unlikely the most promising answer, as
TAQ results showed very high acceptance of the trainings. TAQ results following training 1
were analyzed, consisting of 97.4% of randomized participants, and results indicated almost
identically high rates of training acceptance, ethical procedures, and effectiveness as posttraining TAQ results. The second, and more likely explanation for dropout, could be the nature
of the undergraduate sample. The likely primary motivation for most of the study participants
was to receive extra course credit for their participation, and once they received their desired
amount of credit their motivation to continue in the study could have significantly diminished.
Included in the dropout numbers were two participants in the maintenance condition who
withdrew from the study before completing the first training. The first participant became too
distressed with questions related to depression in the MINI and asked to end participation, and
the second completed the baseline measures, but said the completion of the training and future
trainings would take too much time. These withdrawals do not seem tied to the TAFMAN
condition itself, but to the circumstances of those participants.
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Another limitation in the study was that trainings 2 and 3 were sent by email and
completed by the participants on their own time, wherever they felt was appropriate. Participants
completion of trainings 2 and 3 could not be observed, so it is possible their attention and focus
on these trainings was less than ideal. Training completion times were recorded, and the time it
took for participants to complete trainings 2 and 3 was well within the range of training 1.
Therefore, the idea of significant differences in training experiences for trainings 2 and 3 due to
time is not well supported.
Due to time and resource limitations with the current study and participants a follow-up
procedure with participants was not included in the procedures. Therefore it is unknown if any
potential drops in TAF or OC symptom scores at post-training assessment were maintained, or
even if differences between the groups would have emerged at follow-up. Future studies would
be served well to incorporate a follow-up time point to address these potential interactions.
Currently, there have been no inter-rater analyses completed with the clinician scored
measures. The study independent evaluator was very well trained and had years of experience in
using and scoring the clinician administered measures, but comparing scores with an
independent rater, who reviewed the assessment procedures, would tremendously help the
reliability of the clinician rated measures.
Finally, the study employed per-protocol analyses, but there was no intent to treat
analyses completed. Yet, there were participants who dropped or withdrew from the study after
randomization. As repeated measures ANOVAs were used in many of the primary analyses
participants who dropped or withdrew were automatically excluded in data analyses by SPSS.
Generally, per-protocol analysis tends to produce more favorable treatment outcomes, compared
to the intent-top-treat analysis, as dropouts tend to present more unfavorable treatment responses.
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Therefore, given the current null findings based on the per-protocol analysis and the equivalent
attritions between the two groups, it is unlikely that intent-to-treat analysis would have displayed
significantly different findings.

Future Research
As noted, there was not a follow-up time assessment included in the study design. It
would be important to incorporate a follow-up time point for a few separate reasons. First, a
follow-up would be able to track if any gains or losses made by participants following the end of
training. This would inform if there are any protective or harmful factors which may influence
long term outcomes
As stated earlier, the sample was made up of entirely an undergraduate sample. The
study employed an eligibility screen to ensure at least some level of TAF and OC symptoms
were present in the participants, but using a clinical sample with OCD in the future would be
ideal to test the benefit of the trainings. As clinical OCD does not usually display spontaneous
remission of symptoms, thus changes in measure scores could be more confidently attributed to
training effects.
The current study used a TAF maintenance group for comparison, but future studies
should consider adding further comparison groups. The first consideration for a comparison
group would be a condition where participants complete the pre-training assessment and posttraining assessment with no training. This would allow the study to control for the possible
effects of regression towards the mean, as changes could be attributed to time alone. A second
consideration would be to include a comparison group who completed trainings made of nonTAF scenarios, but still identical in the word completion task format. This group would allow
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for the comparison of possible demand characteristics, as the training would not be formatted to
influence or even tap into TAF obsessions.
Recent research by Craske and colleagues (2014) have identified processes of treatment
implementation which could enhance learning in treating anxiety. Among the suggestions by
Craske et al. (2014) future studies may consider addressing targets such as variability and
multiple contexts to enhance inhibitory learning. First, the study used a training model
including 80 randomized TAF scenarios, and it is possible adding even more scenarios would
lead to greater variability in TAF scenarios, thus increasing the range of TAF beliefs the training
could address. Though, comparatively, this study presented well more scenarios than most other
CBM-I study designs, but adding more scenarios may still increase the variability and impact of
each treatment. A second consideration would be to incorporate the training in multiple
contexts. This could be done by encouraging to participants to complete trainings in the lab, as
well as privately in their homes, traveling, eating, or many other situations. The restriction
would be a finding a place where the participant could complete the training uninterrupted. By
completing the trainings in multiple contexts, learning is encouraged as it is not associated with
the laboratory and computer. By further facilitate this endeavor the use of cell phones or tablets
to complete trainings may enable participants much more freedom, than a desktop or laptop
computer would provide.
Outside of the suggestions made by Craske et al (2014), another consideration, is that
providing participants more training session (i.e. 4, 6, 8, or more) would increase the dosage of
treatment and may have a further impact on the training effects participants experience. The
potential to greatly increase the potency of training may be from incorporating ideographically
tailored TAF thought scenarios. The participant’s obsession could be expressed in a few
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different thought scenario contexts to also ensure a diversity of situations. A final suggestion to
increase treatment potency would be to progressively make each successive training more
difficult than the last to ensure learning is taking place. Ensuring the difficulty increases helps
ensure learning, as with the current sentence completion paradigm, participants are not able to
move on unless they learn to correctly respond. This process could occur in phases, with phase
one having the participant complete the key word in the sentence. Phase two could then have the
participant choose a healthier interpretation of the sentence among competing choices. A final
phase could ask the participant to write out their own healthier responses following the TAF
scenario. These changes, completed in succession, will likely be more challenging to the
participant, but may ensure deeper learning than simply solving an incomplete word. This is also
another way to add variability of the learning context, consistent with the principles of inhibitory
learning (Craske et al., 2014).

Summary
Participants who completed the study procedures, in general, experienced significant
drops in their TAF and OC symptoms scores from pre-training to post-training assessment. As
both the TAFMAN and TAFMOD group experienced significant reductions in scores it is
unclear if the findings can be attributed to a mechanism of the trainings, demand characteristics,
habituation, immunization, or another unknown influence. There were only overall symptom
reductions without the expected group differences in the study findings. Replication using a
larger clinical sample would be useful to examine the effects of CBM-I centered on
dysfunctional TAF beliefs associated with obsessional intrusions.
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Appendix A. Figures
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Figure 2. Pre- to Post-Training TAFS Total Scores
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Figure 3. Pre- to Post-Training TAFS Moral Subscale Scores
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Figure 4. Pre- to Post-Training TAFS Likelihood Subscale Scores
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Figure 5. Pre- to Post-Training ROII Distress Scores
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Figure 6. Pre- to Post-Training ROII Frequency Scores
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Figure 7. Pre- to Post-Training OCI-R Obsession Subscale Scores
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Figure 8. Pre- to Post-Training POETS Total Scores
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Figure 9. Pre- to Post-Training POETS General Emotional Reaction Scores
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Figure 10. Pre- to Post-Training POETS Moral Subscale Scores
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Figure 11. Pre- to Post-Training POETS Likelihood Subscale Group Mean Scores
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Appendix B: Measures

Primary Obsession Evaluation of TAF Scale (POETS)
***Please answer the following questions only regarding your primary obsessional thought
presented on the screen****
0 – Not at all
1 – Slightly
2 – Somewhat
3 – Moderately

4 – Quite
5 – Very
6 – Extremely

General Emotional Reactions
 How unpleasant is this thought?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



How unacceptable is this thought?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



How difficult is it for you to stop this thought?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



How important is it that you control, or suppress, this thought?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



How strong is your desire to avoid situations that might make this thought occur?
0

1 2 3 4 5 6

Moral


How guilty does this thought make you feel?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



To what extent does having this thought mean I am a terrible person?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



To what extent is having this thought as bad as doing/causing it?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



To what extent is having the thought in mind as unacceptable as doing it?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



To what extent does having this thought mean that I am the type of immoral person who would
act on it?
0

1 2 3 4 5 6

Likelihood


How much do you worry that you might act on this thought or that it might otherwise happen
in real life?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



How likely is it that this thought will come true in real life?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



To what extent does thinking about it make it more likely to happen?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



To what extent does having this thought signify harm/danger to yourself or others?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6



Because you have this thought in mind, how responsible would you feel if this actually
occurred?
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TAF SCALE
The following statements refer to experiences that people may have in their daily lives. For each item,
circle the answer best describes how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.
Disagree
Strongly
0

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

1

2

3

Agree
Strongly
4

1. Thinking of making an extremely critical remark to a friend
is almost as unacceptable to me as actually saying
it………………………………….

0

1

2

3

4

2. If I think of a relative/friend losing their job, this increases
the risk that they will lose their
job……………………………………………………

0

1

2

3

4

3. Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to me as a
blasphemous
action………………………………………………………

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

5. If I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this
increases the risk that he/she will have a car
accident………………………………….

0

1

2

3

4

6. When I have a nasty thought about someone else, it is
almost as bad as me carrying out a nasty
action……………………………………………….

0

1

2

3

4

7. If I think of a friend/relative being injured in a fall, this
increases the risk that he/she will have a fall and be
injured……………………………………..

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

4. Thinking about swearing at someone else is almost as
unacceptable to me as actually
swearing……………………………………………………
…

8. Having violent thoughts is almost as unacceptable to me as
violent acts…
9. If I think of a relative/friend falling ill this increases the risk
that he/she will fall
ill……………………………………………………………
…...
10. When I think about making an obscene remark or gesture
in church or synagogue, it is almost as sinful as actually
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doing it……………………..

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

12. If I think of myself being injured in a fall, this increases
the risk that I will have a fall and be
injured……………………………………………

0

1

2

3

4

13. If I think about making an obscene remark or gesture to
someone else, it is almost as bad as doing
it……………………………………………….

0

1

2

3

4

14. When I think of myself being in a car accident, this
increases the risk that I will have a car
accident…………………………………………….

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

11. If I wish harm on someone, it is almost as bad as doing
harm…………..

15. When I think unkindly about a friend, it is almost as
disloyal as doing an unkind
act…………………………………………………………
…..
16. If I think of myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I
will fall ill….
17. If I have a jealous thought, it is almost the same as making
a jealous
remark………………………………………………………
……………
18. Thinking of cheating in a personal relationship is almost as
immoral to me as actually
cheating………………………………………………….
19. Having obscene thoughts in a church or synagogue is
unacceptable to
me…………………………………………………………
……………..
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Treatment Acceptability Questionnaire (for TAF Study)
Please answer these questions that deal with your reactions to the treatment. Circle the number
that best describes your reactions.
Participant ID: ____________ Experimenter: ___________________ Date: ________________
1. Overall, how acceptable did you find the procedure to be?
VERY UNACCEPTABLE

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

VERY ACCEPTABLE

2. How ethical did you think this procedure was?
UNETHICAL

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

FULLY ACCEPTABLE

3. How effective did you think this training was?
VERY INEFFECTIVE

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

VERY EFFECTIVE

4. How distressing did you think the training was?
VERY UNDISTRESSING

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

VERY DISTRESSING

5. How easy did you find the training?
VERY EASY

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

VERY DIFFICULT

6. How strongly was your overall mood affected by the training?
NOT AT ALL

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

VERY STRONGLY

7. How acceptable were the side effects of this treatment?
VERY UNACCEPTABLE

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

VERY ACCEPTABLE

8. How knowledgeable did you think the study staff was?
NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE

9. How trustworthy did you think the study staff was?
VERY UNTRUSTWORTHY

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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VERY TRUSTWORTHY

ROII Distress Assessment Scale
This questionnaire deals with a variety of upsetting, unpleasant thoughts many people report having pop
into their minds from time to time. These thoughts tend to intrude into our minds against our will and
interrupt what we are doing, or what we are already thinking about. Let’s imagine that these thoughts
have just popped into your head. How distressing would each of these thoughts be to you?
0 – Not distressing at all
1 – Slightly distressing
2 – Somewhat distressing
3 – Moderately distressing
4 – Quite distressing
5 – Very distressing
6 – Extremely distressing
While driving, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
1. Driving into a storefront window 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Running the car off the road

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

3. Hitting pedestrians or animals

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

4. Swerving into oncoming traffic 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Purposefully smashing into poles or trees 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
When I see or use a sharp object (knife, razor, scissors, etc.), I have had unacceptable intrusive
thoughts of:
6. Slitting my wrist or throat

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

7. Cutting off my finger, toe or hand 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
When I am in a high place (like a cliff, bridge, window, high building, etc.), I have had unacceptable
intrusive thoughts of:
8. Jumping off of a high place 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
9. Pushing a stranger off of a high place

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

10. Pushing a close friend or family member off of a high place

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

When I am near traffic or railway/subway tracks, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
11. Jumping in front of a train, subway, or car

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

12. Pushing a stranger in front of a train subway or car 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
13. Pushing a close friend or family member in front of a train, subway or car

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

When I am around others and I am not provoked, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
14. Kicking, pushing or otherwise hurting complete strangers
15. Saying something rude to, or insulting a stranger
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

16. Bumping into people in the hallway or tripping them on the stairs 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
17. Insulting someone in authority, such as a police officer, minister or priest

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Even though I am not angry at close friends or family members, and am otherwise unprovoked by
them, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
18. Saying something rude or insulting to one of them 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
19. Hitting or punching one of them 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
20. Choking one of them 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
21. Stabbing one of them with a knife or other sharp object

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Even though I know it's probably not true, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts that:
22. I left the heat, stove or lights on in the house/apartment which may cause a fire 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
23. I left the door of the house apartment unlocked and there is an intruder inside

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

24. I left the water taps running in the house/apartment which may cause a flood

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

When I am in a public gathering (class, meeting, church) and am not provoked, I have had
unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
25. Blurting out obscenities at the person talking 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
26. Accidently belching or "breaking wind" loudly 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
27. Throwing something at the speaker 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
28. Suddenly walking out of the meeting thereby causing a scene 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Even though I am not angry or otherwise provoked, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
29. Scratching the paint of cars I pass with my keys or another sharp object
30. Picking something up and throwing it through a window

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

31. Deliberately breaking or wrecking something (dishes, ornaments, pool table that belongs to me,
my friends or my family 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
32. Shoplifting or stealing something even though I don't really want it

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

33. Grabbing the money out of a cashier's till when purchasing an item 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
34. Holding up the bank teller while doing routine banking 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Out of the blue and for no particular reason, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
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35. Having sex with a person who I would never want to have sex with 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
36. Having sex with a person who has authority over me (minister, boss)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

37. That the fly of my pants is unzipped or that my blouse is unbuttoned 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
38. Throwing my arms around and kissing an authority figure 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
39. Lifting my skirt or dropping my pants, thereby indecently exposing myself 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
40. Engaging in sexual activity that goes against my sexual preference (e.g., homosexual, heterosexual)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Suddenly and for no particular reason I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts of:
41. Authority figures (minister, boss) being naked 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
42. People I come in contact with being naked 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
43. Having sex in a public place 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
44. Engaging in a sexual act that I would find completely disgusting 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
When I am in a public place, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts that:
45. I am going to catch a sexually transmitted disease (STD) from touching a toilet seat or tap
4 5 6

0 1 2 3

46. I will become dirty, or contaminated, by touching public door-knobs 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
47. I will become dirty, or contaminated, by putting a public telephone to my ear
48. I will contract a fatal disease from touching things strangers have touched
49. I will transmit a fatal disease by using public facilities

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Even though the house/apartment already looks tidy, I have had unacceptable intrusive thoughts
that:
50. I must check to ensure that absolutely everything is put away.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

51. I must check to ensure that all specks of dust have been picked up off the floor
52. I must check to see if there is dirt in unseen places
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

